Defining Integralism

I take integralism to be essentially a political philosophy that advocates the integration of the political with the spiritual or transcendent dimension of human life. Although this has been a term used exclusively within Catholic political thought, I would argue that we can and should define it in such a way that Catholic integralism is merely one version of a broader family, including Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist, or even secular-humanist integralisms. I will define integralism as simply the thesis that a political regime ought to operate on the basis of a theory (a set of dogmas) about the ultimate ends and purposes of human life. I will call this fundamental theory the official theology of the regime, but I don’t mean for that term to imply that the theology is even theistic, much less Catholic or Christian. In an integralist regime, the official theology provides the ultimate sanction for laws, political institutions, and coercive practices and guides (i) the regime’s public celebrations, rituals, public use of symbols and stories, (ii) its mandatory indoctrination and inculturation of citizens, both natural and naturalized, and (iii) the limits of tolerance extended to the beliefs and practices of individuals, families, religious groups, and local communities.

A regime’s official theology need not and probably cannot be a comprehensive doctrine (to use Rawls’s phrase). The theology can be relatively sparse compared with the span of possible opinions on ultimate matters, as is in fact the case in respect of Catholic dogma. Dogmatic theology will leave room for wide disagreements, for a dimension of individual prudential judgment, and for the discerning of an individual’s divine calling.

An integrated regime need not be coercive on matters of morals and religion, to say nothing of being totalitarian. Recognition of the natural rights of individuals for free speech, freedom of worship, and individual conscience are compatible with integralism, as is full respect for those rights. It is also compatible with peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation with communities of non-believers, both within and beyond its borders. However, these natural rights of individuals and communities are not absolutely inviolable. If a regime is just and its rulers rational, they will be willing to take extreme measures when the survival of the regime is at stake. This has been true historically of liberal regimes as much as of integralist ones. As Justice Goldberg wrote in 1963: “The Constitution is not a suicide pact.”[1] These provisos would not, however, apply to the right to emigrate, which would be exceptionless.

Catholic theology recognizes the importance of respecting the individual conscience. As Thomas Aquinas explains in Summa Theologia I-II, Q19, a5, even an erring conscience is binding, since “the object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above (Article [3]), from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or evil in themselves.” When the state attempts to force someone to act against his conscience, the effort is either futile and wasteful or, if it succeeds, it involves the state in formal cooperation with evil. Although it is also true that an erring conscience does not excuse when it propels someone into an intrinsically evil act (article 6 of the same Question), it is much worse to incentivize someone into doing evil than merely to permit it. And, as Thomas Aquinas explains, it is not appropriate for the law to forbid all vices, but only those which threaten the common good:

Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like. (Summa Theologiae I-II, Q96 a2)

Of course, the right of individual conscience under integralism is not absolute. Neither is it absolute under Rawls’s version of liberalism:

From the standpoint of justice as fairness it is not true that the conscientious judgments of each person ought absolutely to be respected; nor is it true that individuals are completely free to form their moral convictions. These contentions are mistaken if they mean that, having arrived at our moral opinions conscientiously (as we believe), we always have a claim to be allowed to act on them. (Rawls 1999, pp. 454-5)

Catholic integralism does not entail endorsing all the measures undertaken by Catholic regimes or endorsed by Catholic thinkers in the past (not even thinkers of the stature of St. Thomas Aquinas). This for two reasons. First, there has been considerable development of doctrine on the principles of respect for conscience and toleration of other religions over the last 200 years, culminating in Vatican II’s Dignitatis humanae. Second, and even more importantly, we have learned a great deal from the historical experience of actual consequences of religious tolerance, with a resultant gain in practical wisdom. We can now see, for example, that St. Thomas Aquinas’s analogizing of the toleration of heresy to the toleration of counterfeiting of money (Summa Theologiae II-II Q11, a3) was incorrect (and, of course, we no longer consider counterfeiting a capital crime).[2]

Integralism is compatible with a regime’s relying on reasons outside its own official theology in appealing to non-believers for loyalty and respect for the law. A reasonable integrated regime will take whatever measure it can to earn and to secure the loyalty of its dissenting citizens. However, it would be recognized by all citizens that reasons anchored in the regime’s official theology have a privileged status in law and administration.

Catholic dogma recognizes that the Church’s authority is limited to the baptized. It has long acknowledged the rights of non-Christian minorities to govern themselves and to raise their children in their own religious traditions. Any enforcement of religious norms in a Catholic integrated regime would be limited to those norms that belong to the natural law, accessible to natural human reason, and not to the positive divine law of Scriptures and Tradition. This might include the prohibition of some forms of idolatry and blasphemy.

Catholic dogma insists that saving faith must be voluntary. There is no merit or intrinsic value in merely outward conformity to norms of religious observance. Respect for individual conscience in religion is central to Catholic moral theology. The compulsory conversion of unbelievers is excluded in principle. By parity of reasoning, reconversion from apostasy should also be uncoerced.

Catholic integralism does not entail the desirability or even the permissibility of theocracy. Catholic dogma is clear about the distinction between church and state. Catholic integralist regimes have typically barred clergy from holding political office and denied church leaders the legal authority to use force of any kind. It is lay political officers and not the church hierarchy that are empowered to rule, in light of Catholic dogma. Integralism does entail any increase in the political power or authority of popes, bishops, and other church leaders (relative to liberal regimes).

For Catholic integralists, the political role of the Church is limited to its role of defining the correct dogmas of official theology. But here too, it is the Church and not just the current hierarchs of the Church who must play this role. Lay political leaders are to be guided by what the Church teaches authoritatively, not by the opinion this or that bishop or even the current Pope. Catholic rulers should consult the voice of the Church across the ages, including the Scriptures, Church Fathers, and ecumenical councils. They should bear in mind the distinctions between fallible and infallible teaching, and between exercises of magisterial authority and pastoral advice.

Lay leaders would of course be well advised to consult with the best theological experts, just as they would be to consult with experts in other sciences. However, the Church’s authority is limited to the articulation of moral principles. Political leaders must be free to exercise their own judgment in prudently applying those principles to their concrete situations. The Church has no expertise in matters of natural or social science, except insofar as these are integral to questions of faith and morals.

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[1] Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144.

[2] For one thing, counterfeiters are aware of their attempted deception, while heretics typically believe their own claims to Christian orthodoxy to be true. In many cases, the ignorance of the heretic is invincible, in which case their own salvation is not necessarily negated. Finally, we have historical grounds for believing that heresy can be more effectively contained by rational argument and peaceable Christian witness than by violent force, which creates martyrs for the heretical causes.