Objections to the Grim Reaper Kalam argument: Responses, Part 1

I have a developed a suite of arguments, based on the Grim Reaper paradox of Jose Benardete (Infinity, 1968) for two related conclusions: the impossibility of infinite causal regresses and the necessary finitude of the past. (See my related posts: The anti-regress argument and the unsatisfiable pair diagnosis. Here are my published papers and articles:Continue reading “Objections to the Grim Reaper Kalam argument: Responses, Part 1”

The First Way Further Developed

Here is our translation of the first section of Aquinas’s First Way (from the Summa Theologiae I, Q2, a3): The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion (change). It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is moved is moved byContinue reading “The First Way Further Developed”

Jesus, Mary, and Moral Responsibility

Let’s turn now to the third challenge to free will and responsibility: the cases of Jesus and Mary,. First, I need to say something about supererogation. A human action can be morally significant two distinct and non-overlapping ways: by fulfilling or failing to fulfill our all-things-considered moral duties (that is, by being sinful or notContinue reading “Jesus, Mary, and Moral Responsibility”

Aristotle and Ultimate Responsibility

This is the second in a series of posts on the relevance of neo-Aristotelian philosophy of nature and the problem of free will. As I mentioned in the first post, disposing of the threat of determinism is not sufficient to resolve all the problems arising from the idea of free will. Free will seems problematic,Continue reading “Aristotle and Ultimate Responsibility”

Aristotle, Time, and Free Will

Free will and moral responsibility are important for many reasons —legal, as well as theological. Thanks to advances in both science and philosophy, the specter of determinism is no longer a serious threat to belief in free will, but that doesn’t mean that we are out of the woods yet. I consider three additional challengesContinue reading “Aristotle, Time, and Free Will”

Just War and Group Intentions, II

Here is a hypothetical case of group intention, formulated by Ben Koons: Imagine the following case: the country Freedonia consists of three ethnic groups: Blue, Violet, and Green, which are each perfectly represented by an ephor, while a king presents the resolutions to be voted on for any judgment. Its founders framed the Freedonian constitutionContinue reading “Just War and Group Intentions, II”

Just War and Group Intentions, I

Much of the theory of just war assumes that the warmaker is a single individual, the prince. It is doubtful whether this has ever been true: even in so-called ‘absolute monarchies,’ the prince relies on councilors, advisors, and even some relatively independent collaborators (including bishops and parliaments). In modern times, it is undeniable that itContinue reading “Just War and Group Intentions, I”

Two New Books on the Five Ways

My colleague, Dan Bonevac, and I are putting the final touches on two manuscripts about Thomas Aquinas’s Five Ways. One is designed for an academic press, and the other for a more popular or “trade” press. We think that the first will probably be appearing in late 2026, and the other a few months later.Continue reading “Two New Books on the Five Ways”

God’s (Finite) Mercy

That God is merciful signifies that God gives to His creatures benefits that go beyond the requirements of justice. If we assume, as Thomas does, that existence itself is a good, then God’s mercy is in evidence in His creating us, since none of us had (prior to existing) a right to exist based onContinue reading “God’s (Finite) Mercy”