This is the second in a series of posts on the relevance of neo-Aristotelian philosophy of nature and the problem of free will. As I mentioned in the first post, disposing of the threat of determinism is not sufficient to resolve all the problems arising from the idea of free will. Free will seems problematic, even in an indeterministic, partly chancy world. In this post, we’ll turn to the second of these challenges, Galen Strawson’s 1994 argument against ultimate moral responsibility.
A rational agent can act irrationally, by way of defective functioning. This isn’t mere randomness nor is it a case of passivity. The agent acts knowingly and for an intelligible purpose, and it is the agent, through the exercise of his own powers, that results in the morally defective action.
Given the Choice Principle of Alternative Possibilities (discussed in my last post), such an agent was capable, at least in some minimal sense, of making the better choice. Nonetheless, Galen Strawson argues that no such agent can be held to be morally responsible for the bad choice. Here is what Strawson called “The Basic Argument”:
(1) Nothing can be causa sui —-that is, nothing can be the cause of itself.
(2) In order to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions one would have to be causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects.
(3) Therefore nothing can be truly morally responsible.
I’m not going to challenge premise (1), nor will I resort to some kind of infinite regress of self-causing choices (as Roderick Chisholm proposed at one point). So, the crucial premise is (2)— why should “true” moral responsibility involve self-causation?
On page 6 of his 1994 Philosophical Studies article, Strawson spells out the case for (2):
(A) When one acts for a reason, what one does is a function of how one is, mentally speaking. (It is also a function of one’s height, one’s strength, one’s place and time, and so on. But the mental factors are crucial when moral responsibility is in question.)
(B) So if one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, one must be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking – at least in certain respects.
(C) To be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must have brought it about that one is the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects. And it is not merely that one must have caused oneself to be the way one is, mentally speaking. One must have consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, and one must have succeeded in bringing it about that one is that way.
What does Strawson mean by the “is a function of” language in step A? He can’t mean that what we do is determined by how one is, mentally speaking, since this would be to assume a kind of psychological determinism, and Strawson’s problem is supposed to apply to undetermined choices. Perhaps he means: how one is mentally determines the probabilities of one’s taking various actions. Or minimally: how one is mentally determines which choices are possible or impossible for one (in the circumstances, at the time of action). I’m skeptical about whether there are well-defined, objective probabilities for free choices, but I’m willing to accept the minimal claim: how one is mentally determines what one is (psychologically) capable of doing or not doing. I am also willing to accept that we can in some cases talk about a free action as being a reliable consequence of our habits (our virtues and vices). That is, when we have well-developed habits of the relevant kind.
The crucial assumption. Step (C) is very far from obvious. Here is the principle that Strawson seems to be relying on:
Character-based Condition on Moral Responsibility (Strawson): x is morally responsible for choice of A over B only if (i) the choice of A over B was morally significant, (ii) x’s choice of A over B was a reliable consequence of x’s character (or if the choice of A would have been impossible, had x’s character been relevantly different), and (iii) x was morally responsible for his acquiring the relevant features of his character.
Strawson’s principle has some real force. If someone acts badly but out of character, we are more inclined to treat the sin as an excusable error. Less so when the act flows inexorably from a bad character. We might also blame someone who acts badly in an unpredictable way, if we suppose that a good character would have made that choice impossible. But, Strawson asks, how can we blame someone reasonably if no one cannot be morally responsible for his own morally flawed character?
Our character consists of our virtues and vices, which fall into the Aristotelian category of ‘habits’. A habit is typically acquired by practice and guided repetition, but not always. Bits of knowledge count as habits, as do the infused theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity). A virtue is an internal, perfective development of a person’s moral and rational powers and potentialities, and a vice is an imperfect, a mal-adjustment, of those same powers. A virtuous person regularly and reliably deliberates and chooses well, resulting in good actions. A person lacking both virtues and vices (like Adam and Eve in the garden, or a young child just reaching the age of reason) will not be reliably good or reliably bad.
I propose that we distinguish between ontological and full moral responsibility. Choice PAP ensures that rational agents are difference-makers and so are ontologically responsible for their choices. But when those choices do not flow predictably from one’s moral character, one is ontologically but not morally responsible for those choices, even when those choices are in fact irrational and immoral.
So, here is my proposal for defining moral responsibility in light of Strawson’s challenge:
Character-based Condition on Moral Responsibility (Koons): x is morally responsible for choice of A over B only if (i) the choice of A over B was morally significant, (ii) x’s choice of A over B was a reliable consequence of x’s character (or if the choice of A would have been impossible, had x’s character been relevantly different), and (iii) x was ontologically responsible for his acquiring the relevant features of his character.
The difference between the two conditions lies in clause iii. Strawson will argue that ultimate moral responsibility requires that we be morally and not just ontologically responsible for our own character. This won’t work as part of a definition of moral responsibility, since the definition would then become viciously circular, but Strawson could argue that his new principle could nonetheless be a necessary truth, even if not a definition. If it is necessarily true, then it quickly follows that we are never morally responsible for anything, so long as causation cannot be circular or infinitely regressing.
But given that it cannot be a definition, we can legitimately ask why we should believe it, rather than my weaker principle, to be a necessary truth. Since we know that there is such a thing as moral responsibility, we should reject any principle that entails that this category is necessarily empty.
Let’s consider an illustration of my condition: Adam and Eve in the garden They were ontologically responsible for choosing the eat the forbidden fruit, but not yet morally responsible. They were at least in part morally responsible for their subsequent attempts to defend their conduct and to shift the blame to God Himself” “it was the woman you (God) gave to be with me who gave me fruit from the tree.” (Gen. 3:12)
Reward and Punishment
Moral responsibility is a precondition of being rewarded or punished. Rewards and punishments are to an extent coordinate notions. Not to reward is a mild form of punishment, and not to punish is a weak form of reward. But punishment is especially problematic, since it involves the intentional inflicting of pain, disgrace, deprivation, and other forms of harm.
This prompts the so-called humanitarian objection to punishment. No one ever deserves to be punished. This is in fact Strawson’s position: the justification of retributive punishment depends on ultimate moral responsibility, which is impossible. But, moral responsibility or desert can play more than one role in respect of punishment. As C. S. Lewis pointed out (in his essay “The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment”), the principle of desert is a limiting principle: it constrains the state and the community from punishing too much. If desert no longer functions as a constraint, then the state would be free to intervene forcibly, in the name of therapy and rehabilitation, without limit. Desert carves out a zone of individual autonomy and privacy. It ensures that the state will not be able to interfere with my life intentionally so long as I avoid acts deserving of punishment.
Non-retributive punishment serves at least four purposes: rehabilitation, deterrence, education of the general public, and preserving the perception of fairness by erasing the unjust gains from criminal enterprises. These four purposes can also apply even to the punishments of hell (as Eleonore Stump has argued). Punishment in hell can keep the damned from becoming even worse and might to some degree make them somewhat better.
I think there is no good reason to suppose, as Augustine and Immanuel Kant did, that punishment is an intrinsic good, good apart from its consequences. Rejecting this extreme, Kantian view relieves some of the pressure to accept Strawson’s impossibly high standard for moral responsibility. My theory of “penultimate” moral responsibility allows desert to continue to play its limiting role, placing boundaries around permissible non-retributive punishment.
Next week, I will turn to a third challenge to free will and responsibility: the cases of the free yet sinless lives of Jesus and Mary.
