The Pluralization Argument

My second argument for a First Cause relies on the Pluralized version of the principle of Universal Causation. Let’s assume again that the Universe exists, that is, that there are some broadly causable things.

Is the Universe itself broadly causable? Each member of the universe is broadly causable (by definition). So, we can conceive of a scenario I call “Two-Worlds.” In the Two-Worlds scenario, there are two parallel universes: our universe and a second one, Universe-2, where each member of our Universe (Universe-1) is caused in the Two-Worlds scenario by a member of Universe-2. This scenario is clearly conceivable, and in this scenario our Universe is caused by a second plurality. This is true even if the Universe contains one or more infinite regresses. If our Universe is infinitely regressing, then our imagined Universe-2 will also regress infinitely.

This shows us that we can conceive of our Universe having a cause. So, by definition, the Universe is broadly causable. Now we can apply the Pluralized Causal Principle, which tells us that the Universe must have an actual cause. This actual cause will consist of one or more things that do not belong to the universe—that is, it will consist of one or more strictly uncausable things, that collectively constitute an uncaused First Cause of the universe.

Here is a possible objection. If our Universe does regress infinitely, then it might have an infinitely long past. We can assume that each member of the Universe is caused by other members of the Universe at some point in this infinite past. When, then, can the supposed cause of the Universe do its causing? If we say that the First Uncausable Cause caused the universe in n B. C., this seems to be impossible, since we are supposing that many members of the Universe were already in existence then. The year n B.C. seems to be too late for the supposed causing to occur. In addition, the things existing in n B. C. were caused by the things existing before n B. C., and so the supposed First Cause seems redundant. We would have to suppose that everything in the Universe was caused twice over: first by its predecessors in the Universe, and then again by the First Cause.

Here is my response to this objection. We could suppose that each thing in the Universe is caused both by its time-bound predecessors and by the First Cause, but not independently. The First Cause could cause each thing x in the Universe by causing x’s predecessors and by using those predecessors as instruments in the cause of x itself. If causal regresses make sense (which I doubt), then such an infinite case of instrumental causation would also make sense. We don’t end up with an objectionable form of overdetermination or redundant causation. The First Cause’s causing of the Universe is spread across all of time.