Strictly Uncausable Things

There is a good reason for thinking that the existence of a strictly uncausable thing (the sort of thing that composes any First Cause of the Universe) would have to be atemporal, beyond the limits of time. Any time-bound entity would be the sort of thing that could change and that could conceivably even begin or cease to exist. Anything that is subject to change, especially to the kind of change involved in beginning or ceasing to exist, is the sort of thing that we can conceive of as being caused to begin to exist. So, a strictly uncausable thing must be essentially atemporal.

But how can something outside of time cause the things that make up the universe, much (if not all) of which exist within time? Can a non-temporal cause have a temporal effect? I have assumed that time does not enter into the definition of causation, and so there is no bar to a causal relation holding between two non-temporal items, or between a non-temporal and a temporal thing.

Intentional relations, like remembering, anticipating, admiring, contemplating, can stand between a mind existing at one time and an object existing at any other time. Intentional relations are intrinsically free from temporal constraints. Consequently, we can conceive of a timeless intellect that stands eternally in an intentional relation to temporal things. We also know from person experience that intentional relations can be causal: I can make something happen by willing it to happen, for example, I can create a mental image of a hippopotamus by willing that I should have such an image, and I can move my hand by willing my hand to move. So, there is no obstacle to a non-temporal mind’s causing temporal things to exist by a timeless act of will. We can see an analogy of this in the act of a writer’s imagining a new timeline, like Tolkien’s imagination of the temporal structure of Middle Earth. Tolkien was able to create that imagined timeline without actually being a part of it.

If the First Cause has any quantities associated with it, they would have to be immeasurably great. Any finite entity is broadly causable. So, a strictly uncausable thing must be infinite with respect to every relevant parameter.

The First Cause would have to be absolutely simple. Compound things are broadly causable.

A First Cause would have to exist necessarily and by its own essence, since contingent things are broadly causable. And a necessary being that is caused to exist necessarily is obviously causable.

Thomas Aquinas argues further that a First Cause must have an essence or nature that is identical to its own act of existence (De Ente et Essentia, paragraphs 77-80; see also Kerr 2015). If the essence of the First Cause were distinct from its existence, we could conceive of something causing their juncture. To cause something to exist is to give actual existence to some creatable essence, but in this case there is no distinct essence to receive existence. There would be in such a case then no distinction between the possible existence of such a being (its essence sans existence) and its actual existence. Since possibilities exist as such in every possible world, if such a being is possible, it will exist necessarily.

We do not know a priori that such a thing is possible, which is why we need the First Cause argument. We cannot even grasp the essence of such a thing (at least not in this life),[1] but the First Cause argument gives us compelling reason to believe that there must be some strictly uncausable essence and that this essence is actually (and even necessarily) instantiated.

Moreover, the First Cause will turn out to be identical to its own essence, since it is absolutely simple and has no mere potentialities. So, for each uncausable essence, there can be only one existing entity that belongs to that essence, since if there were another, it would also have to be identical to the shared essence and thus to the first entity. Since the essence of an uncausable thing must be identical to the thing’s act of existence, any such essence will be the essence of a being of pure, unadulterated existence. There couldn’t be two distinct essences of this kind, since two essences can be two only by one’s including something not contained by the other, but the uncausable essences cannot contain anything beyond pure existence. So, there can be only one uncausable First Cause, which we can then describe accurately as “the” cause of the Universe.

Here’s a possible objection: why couldn’t we suppose that there is a finite and temporally realizable essence that includes being uncaused or being uncausable in its very definition? Why couldn’t there be, for example, an essence defined as that of an uncaused rock? If there were such an essence, we could know a priori that anything that had that essence was uncaused and even uncausable. Such an uncausable rock could then be the First Cause of the universe.

I would respond that essences aren’t the sort of thing we can simply define into existence by stipulation. When an essence exists, its real definition is such that each of its logical parts cohere together, in such a way that none can be deleted without rendering the supposed definition into a mere fiction, no longer defining any real essence. Rocks have essences (like bodies made of granite), and the real definitions of these essences are complete prior to the addition of such a property as being uncaused. If we try to glom together an arbitrary set of properties (like being a rock and being uncaused), we will fail to define any real essence at all.

The essences of fundamental things (which Aristotle calls ousiai or substances) have real definitions that refer only to the intrinsic features and principles of the thing. Whether a thing is caused or causable is an extrinsic feature of the thing. It can follow from that definition but cannot be contained in it.

These reflections help to explain why all natural things, including our minds and their contents, our environment, and everything else contained in space and time, are broadly causable. It is obvious that none of them have the kind of essence that would rend them intrinsically uncausable. Even though we do not know the essences or real definitions of most natural things, we know enough about them (given the arguments earlier in this section) to conclude that their essences do not make them strictly uncausable.

In addition, we cannot know a priori that the contents of mind are located in time after the beginning of time. For all I can know a priori, the universe and time itself began to exist right now. So, we cannot exclude things that are “temporally first” from our principle of Universal Causation. Similarly, we cannot know a priori that the contents of my mind do not contain causal loops or infinite causal regresses (unless I can know a priori that such loops and regresses are impossible). For example, for all I know, my present visual experience V₁ was caused by a very similar experience V₂ a nanosecond ago, and V₂ could have been caused by V₃ a half-nanosecond before that, and so on ad infinitum. So, we cannot exclude pluralities that contain causal loops or infinite regresses from our pluralized version of Universal Causation.

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[1]See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Part I, question 2, article 1, and question 12, article 4.