robkoons

Is Substantiality Accidental?

Is substantiality accidental? Can something change from being a substance to being a non-substantial part and back again? Can something change from being fundamental to being non-fundamental or vice versa? It’s clear that things cannot gain or lose the status of being fundamental, since being grounded by something else is anchored in a thing’s essence,Continue reading “Is Substantiality Accidental?”

Substances, Accidents, and the Tiling Principle

Jonathan Schaffer has proposed the Tiling Principle. Here’s a version of the principle, translated into Aristotelian terms: Strong Tiling Principle TPS1. Necessarily, no substance is a proper part of any other substance. TPS2. Necessarily, the sum of all substances includes every real thing as a part. I will call the conjunction of TPS1 and TPS2Continue reading “Substances, Accidents, and the Tiling Principle”

The Survival of Accidents and Material Parts

I will assume that individual accidents have real definitions, but that these definitions are shared by all the members of an infima species of quality, quantity, or whatever. These definitions include some predication of properties to an external entity (the substance in which an accident must inhere). But the definition won’t include any particular substanceContinue reading “The Survival of Accidents and Material Parts”

Defining ‘Substance’ Using Ontological Dependence

I want to propose here an alternative approach to defining ‘substance’: using Fine’s notion of ontological dependence (1995), instead of relying exclusively on grounding (as in this previous post). A thing x ontologically depends on y iff the essence (real definition) of x includes y. Fine believes in individual essences –the essence of an individualContinue reading “Defining ‘Substance’ Using Ontological Dependence”

Defining ‘Substance’ Using Grounding

If my account in my previous post of fundamentality is right, the distinction between what is fundamental and what is derived is not going to enable us to distinguish substances from proper parts and accidents. However, we still might try to use grounding to explicate the difference. Perhaps we could say that in some senseContinue reading “Defining ‘Substance’ Using Grounding”

The Fundamentality of Composite Things

We can use grounding to define fundamental entities: F1. A thing x is fundamental iff the existence and intrinsic properties of x are not wholly grounded by the existence and intrinsic properties of any other thing or things. Some have suggested that we add the qualification: not wholly grounded by the existence and intrinsic propertiesContinue reading “The Fundamentality of Composite Things”

Aristotle against Infinite Regress, III

Aristotle’s third argument also occurs in Physics VIII, 5. Let’s suppose (for contradiction) that there is an infinite regress of motions, M1 moved by M2, M2 by M3, etc. We’re going to simplify somewhat Aristotle’s actual argument. Aristotle proceeds by way of a dilemma, setting up a disjunction of two alternatives: either (i) in allContinue reading “Aristotle against Infinite Regress, III”

Aristotle against Infinite Regress, II

Aristotle’s second argument against an infinite regress of motions is the one that Thomas Aquinas relies upon in the First Way. It occurs in Physics VIII, chapter 5. In this argument, Aristotle makes a distinction between two kinds of causes: primary and intermediate. If we have a series of motions that are causally related, andContinue reading “Aristotle against Infinite Regress, II”

Aristotle: Two Kinds of Infinite Regress

The first problem we face, when interpreting Aristotle’s arguments against an infinite causal regress of motions in Physics VII and VIII is the apparent inconsistency between his no-regress arguments and his explicit belief that the universe is infinitely old. Aristotle believed that each of us has infinitely long family tree: father, grandfather, great-grandfather, and soContinue reading “Aristotle: Two Kinds of Infinite Regress”

Why does Time Pass?

Aristotle assumes, in his arguments for an Unmoved Mover in Physics VII and VIII, that all of the causes of motion that he is considering are non-successive, in the sense that the cause does not end before the effect ends. Why does he do so? Not because he thinks that all causes are non-successive. AsContinue reading “Why does Time Pass?”