Author Archives: robkoons

Two Models of The Soul

Here is a major choice point: is the soul part of the whole substance (the human person or organism) or not? What does it mean for something to be part of some whole? Or, equivalently, what does it mean for something to be a whole composed of certain parts? I propose the following necessary conditionContinue reading “Two Models of The Soul”

Four Arguments for Persisting Prime Matter

Here are four arguments in support of my “master argument” for prime matter. Symmetrical (Max-Black) Worlds (Steps 1-5) Imagine a world consisting of a single perfectly spherical and continuous substance. It will have infinitely many parts – e.g., an uncountable infinity of hemispheres. Each hemisphere will instantiate the very same species of quantitative accident (i.e.,Continue reading “Four Arguments for Persisting Prime Matter”

Master Argument for Prime Matter

Some kind of individuator is required in every conceivable world by Aristotelian realism, whenever there are two or more members of an infima species. Given the isotropy of space, spatially symmetrical universes are conceivable. Spatially symmetrical material substances are conceivable. Given 2 and 3, there are conceivable worlds in which there are multiple parts ofContinue reading “Master Argument for Prime Matter”

A Three-Valued B Theory for Aristotelians?

Let’s turn our attention now to the B Theory, in particular, to what I’ve called the Mixed B Theory. We can suppose that all actual substances and accidents, past, present, and future, are combined eternally with acts of existence, distinguishing them from merely possible substances and accidents. Is such a model compatible with Aristotelianism? SeeContinue reading “A Three-Valued B Theory for Aristotelians?”

Time and Modality: Mapping the Territory

Are actuality and presentness perfectly analogous? David Lewis would say Yes, since both are the by-products of the linguistic phenomenon of indexicality. Non-actual and non-present things and events are as much part of the reality as the actual present. We’ll just call this view ‘Lewisian’. There’s two kinds of A Theorists who could agree withContinue reading “Time and Modality: Mapping the Territory”

Inegalitarian (Aristotelian) A Theory

Storrs McCall’s Falling Branches model (1976) is the most attractive version of the A Theory of time for Aristotelians, since it relies on the changing modal status of possible events. It is also easy to combine with the idea that all possibilities branch off from the actual world. We can suppose that every event orContinue reading “Inegalitarian (Aristotelian) A Theory”

Objections to Aristotelian Substances

The Argument from Vagueness (David Lewis and Jonathan Schaffer) Unlike atoms and the whole cosmos, the boundaries of Aristotelian substances seem vague and arbitrary. Response: the vagueness is only epistemic. The true parts of a substance are essentially parts of it. The Empirical Argument from Atomism It is hard to believe that individual particles, atoms,Continue reading “Objections to Aristotelian Substances”

Is Substantiality Accidental?

Is substantiality accidental? Can something change from being a substance to being a non-substantial part and back again? Can something change from being fundamental to being non-fundamental or vice versa? It’s clear that things cannot gain or lose the status of being fundamental, since being grounded by something else is anchored in a thing’s essence,Continue reading “Is Substantiality Accidental?”

Substances, Accidents, and the Tiling Principle

Jonathan Schaffer has proposed the Tiling Principle. Here’s a version of the principle, translated into Aristotelian terms: Strong Tiling Principle TPS1. Necessarily, no substance is a proper part of any other substance. TPS2. Necessarily, the sum of all substances includes every real thing as a part. I will call the conjunction of TPS1 and TPS2Continue reading “Substances, Accidents, and the Tiling Principle”