First Way – The Analytic Thomist

Aristotle against Infinite Regress, III

Aristotle’s third argument also occurs in Physics VIII, 5. Let’s suppose (for contradiction) that there is an infinite regress of motions, M1 moved by M2, M2 by M3, etc. We’re going to simplify somewhat Aristotle’s actual argument. Aristotle proceeds by way of a dilemma, setting up a disjunction of two alternatives: either (i) in allContinue reading “Aristotle against Infinite Regress, III”

Why does Time Pass?

Aristotle assumes, in his arguments for an Unmoved Mover in Physics VII and VIII, that all of the causes of motion that he is considering are non-successive, in the sense that the cause does not end before the effect ends. Why does he do so? Not because he thinks that all causes are non-successive. AsContinue reading “Why does Time Pass?”

Four Problems with the First Way

It will be convenient to break the claim about the finiteness of causal chains into two parts: first, the impossibility of circular causation, and second, the impossibility of noncyclical infinite regresses. To establish that circular causation is impossible, we need two assumptions: that causation is transitive, and that no change causes itself. Here’s the argument:Continue reading “Four Problems with the First Way”

Interpreting the First Way

Here is the text of the First Way (from the Leontine translation, with a few minor changes by the authors, set in italics): The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is movedContinue reading “Interpreting the First Way”