Fundamentality – The Analytic Thomist

Two Models of The Soul

Here is a major choice point: is the soul part of the whole substance (the human person or organism) or not? What does it mean for something to be part of some whole? Or, equivalently, what does it mean for something to be a whole composed of certain parts? I propose the following necessary conditionContinue reading “Two Models of The Soul”

Is Substantiality Accidental?

Is substantiality accidental? Can something change from being a substance to being a non-substantial part and back again? Can something change from being fundamental to being non-fundamental or vice versa? It’s clear that things cannot gain or lose the status of being fundamental, since being grounded by something else is anchored in a thing’s essence,Continue reading “Is Substantiality Accidental?”

Defining ‘Substance’ Using Ontological Dependence

I want to propose here an alternative approach to defining ‘substance’: using Fine’s notion of ontological dependence (1995), instead of relying exclusively on grounding (as in this previous post). A thing x ontologically depends on y iff the essence (real definition) of x includes y. Fine believes in individual essences –the essence of an individualContinue reading “Defining ‘Substance’ Using Ontological Dependence”

Defining ‘Substance’ Using Grounding

If my account in my previous post of fundamentality is right, the distinction between what is fundamental and what is derived is not going to enable us to distinguish substances from proper parts and accidents. However, we still might try to use grounding to explicate the difference. Perhaps we could say that in some senseContinue reading “Defining ‘Substance’ Using Grounding”

The Fundamentality of Composite Things

We can use grounding to define fundamental entities: F1. A thing x is fundamental iff the existence and intrinsic properties of x are not wholly grounded by the existence and intrinsic properties of any other thing or things. Some have suggested that we add the qualification: not wholly grounded by the existence and intrinsic propertiesContinue reading “The Fundamentality of Composite Things”