Infinite Regress – The Analytic Thomist

Strictly Uncausable Things

There is a good reason for thinking that the existence of a strictly uncausable thing (the sort of thing that composes any First Cause of the Universe) would have to be atemporal, beyond the limits of time. Any time-bound entity would be the sort of thing that could change and that could conceivably even beginContinue reading “Strictly Uncausable Things”

Infinite Regresses: The Unsatisfiable Pair Diagnosis

This is a follow-up to a previous post, in which I presented an argument against the conceivability of infinite regresses. Some critics (Schmid and Malpass, forthcoming) have argued that the Patchwork Principle too strong. Perhaps we should add an exception: Revised Patchwork Principle. If (i) a certain causal structure S is conceivable, (ii) a finiteContinue reading “Infinite Regresses: The Unsatisfiable Pair Diagnosis”

The Anti-Regress Argument for a First Cause

This is the first of two new arguments for a first cause. Check out an earlier post that contains the relevant definitions. Therefore, everything in the universe is caused by one or more strictly uncausable things. Consequently, there is a plurality of one or more strictly uncausable things (the First Cause) that jointly causes theContinue reading “The Anti-Regress Argument for a First Cause”

Some New Arguments for a First Cause

I’m going to start a new series of posts in which I present some of my most recent thoughts on the classic First Cause arguments. In this post, I will lay out some explications and definitions for some key terms that will appear in my arguments. Some of the terms are so fundamental that theyContinue reading “Some New Arguments for a First Cause”

Aristotle against Infinite Regress, III

Aristotle’s third argument also occurs in Physics VIII, 5. Let’s suppose (for contradiction) that there is an infinite regress of motions, M1 moved by M2, M2 by M3, etc. We’re going to simplify somewhat Aristotle’s actual argument. Aristotle proceeds by way of a dilemma, setting up a disjunction of two alternatives: either (i) in allContinue reading “Aristotle against Infinite Regress, III”

Aristotle: Two Kinds of Infinite Regress

The first problem we face, when interpreting Aristotle’s arguments against an infinite causal regress of motions in Physics VII and VIII is the apparent inconsistency between his no-regress arguments and his explicit belief that the universe is infinitely old. Aristotle believed that each of us has infinitely long family tree: father, grandfather, great-grandfather, and soContinue reading “Aristotle: Two Kinds of Infinite Regress”