Parts – The Analytic Thomist

Hylomorphism and Mereology

Some questions and thoughts about hylomorphism and mereology (parts and wholes). Is the substance the sum of its material parts? In some sense, yes, and in some sense, no? The sum of my prime material parts exists as a potentiality, even in the absence of me and my substantial form. That sum does not haveContinue reading “Hylomorphism and Mereology”

Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, II

In this post, I will deal with three additional anomalies, possible exceptions to the NSIS principle (No Substance in a Substance): (i) manufacturing organisms from scratch, (ii) borderline cases between organisms and communities, and (iii) transitional forms in evolution. If Hylomorphism is true, it should be impossible to manufacture a living organism from inorganic materials,Continue reading “Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, II”

Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, I

The form provides the organism with its actual existence and nature, and, in turn, the substantial form is individuated by the organism’s prime matter (together with its actual history). The form’s function is to animate and (we might say) rationalize matter, resulting in a sentient and rational organism (in the case of human beings). WhenContinue reading “Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, I”

Two Models of The Soul

Here is a major choice point: is the soul part of the whole substance (the human person or organism) or not? What does it mean for something to be part of some whole? Or, equivalently, what does it mean for something to be a whole composed of certain parts? I propose the following necessary conditionContinue reading “Two Models of The Soul”

Four Arguments for Persisting Prime Matter

Here are four arguments in support of my “master argument” for prime matter. Imagine a world consisting of a single perfectly spherical and continuous substance. It will have infinitely many parts – e.g., an uncountable infinity of hemispheres. Each hemisphere will instantiate the very same species of quantitative accident (i.e., size and shape). If weContinue reading “Four Arguments for Persisting Prime Matter”

Substances, Accidents, and the Tiling Principle

Jonathan Schaffer has proposed the Tiling Principle. Here’s a version of the principle, translated into Aristotelian terms: Strong Tiling Principle TPS1. Necessarily, no substance is a proper part of any other substance. TPS2. Necessarily, the sum of all substances includes every real thing as a part. I will call the conjunction of TPS1 and TPS2Continue reading “Substances, Accidents, and the Tiling Principle”

The Survival of Accidents and Material Parts

I will assume that individual accidents have real definitions, but that these definitions are shared by all the members of an infima species of quality, quantity, or whatever. These definitions include some predication of properties to an external entity (the substance in which an accident must inhere). But the definition won’t include any particular substanceContinue reading “The Survival of Accidents and Material Parts”