This is the second in a series on the doctrine of transubstantiation. Here I want to focus on further theological reasons for preferring Aristotelian hylomorphism to any kind of substance dualism (like Cartesianism). Here is what the Council of Trent taught about the Eucharist: “In the most blessed sacrament of the Eucharist ‘the body andContinue reading ““Body, blood, soul, and divinity””
Category Archives: Soul
Hylomorphism and Mereology
Some questions and thoughts about hylomorphism and mereology (parts and wholes). Is the substance the sum of its material parts? In some sense, yes, and in some sense, no? The sum of my prime material parts exists as a potentiality, even in the absence of me and my substantial form. That sum does not haveContinue reading “Hylomorphism and Mereology”
Advantages of Hylomorphism over Modern Substance Dualism
What are the advantages of hylomorphism over modern substance dualism? At very low levels in the Chain of Being, like the souls of sponges or amoebas, the soul seems to be doing no explanatory work. The soul of an amoeba would seem to be epiphenomenal and causally inert. How would a soulless amoeba function differently?Continue reading “Advantages of Hylomorphism over Modern Substance Dualism”
Mental Causation: Rational Animals
Let’s turn our attention now to the most interesting case: that of the rational animal (the human being). Human beings have the capacity not only to sense and to imagine but to understand. Understanding in this sense involves the capacity to grasp something universal, a concept that can be used to formulate general propositions andContinue reading “Mental Causation: Rational Animals”
Mental Causation: Non-Rational Animals
It’s relatively easy to see how mental causation, both active and passive, would work on the interactionist model. We can simply apply our usual assumptions about per se efficient causal powers. What is more interesting is to work out how such causation could happen on the two emanationist models. To keep things relatively simple, let’sContinue reading “Mental Causation: Non-Rational Animals”
Two Models of The Soul
Here is a major choice point: is the soul part of the whole substance (the human person or organism) or not? What does it mean for something to be part of some whole? Or, equivalently, what does it mean for something to be a whole composed of certain parts? I propose the following necessary conditionContinue reading “Two Models of The Soul”
The Analytic Thomist 