I want to propose here an alternative approach to defining ‘substance’: using Fine’s notion of ontological dependence (1995), instead of relying exclusively on grounding (as in this previous post). A thing x ontologically depends on y iff the essence (real definition) of x includes y. Fine believes in individual essences –the essence of an individualContinue reading “Defining ‘Substance’ Using Ontological Dependence”
Category Archives: Substances
Defining ‘Substance’ Using Grounding
If my account in my previous post of fundamentality is right, the distinction between what is fundamental and what is derived is not going to enable us to distinguish substances from proper parts and accidents. However, we still might try to use grounding to explicate the difference. Perhaps we could say that in some senseContinue reading “Defining ‘Substance’ Using Grounding”
The Fundamentality of Composite Things
We can use grounding to define fundamental entities: F1. A thing x is fundamental iff the existence and intrinsic properties of x are not wholly grounded by the existence and intrinsic properties of any other thing or things. Some have suggested that we add the qualification: not wholly grounded by the existence and intrinsic propertiesContinue reading “The Fundamentality of Composite Things”
The Analytic Thomist 