Infinite Regresses: The Unsatisfiable Pair Diagnosis

This is a follow-up to a previous post, in which I presented an argument against the conceivability of infinite regresses. Some critics (Schmid and Malpass, forthcoming) have argued that the Patchwork Principle too strong. Perhaps we should add an exception: Revised Patchwork Principle. If (i) a certain causal structure S is conceivable, (ii) a finiteContinue reading “Infinite Regresses: The Unsatisfiable Pair Diagnosis”

The Anti-Regress Argument for a First Cause

This is the first of two new arguments for a first cause. Check out an earlier post that contains the relevant definitions. Therefore, everything in the universe is caused by one or more strictly uncausable things. Consequently, there is a plurality of one or more strictly uncausable things (the First Cause) that jointly causes theContinue reading “The Anti-Regress Argument for a First Cause”

Some New Arguments for a First Cause

I’m going to start a new series of posts in which I present some of my most recent thoughts on the classic First Cause arguments. In this post, I will lay out some explications and definitions for some key terms that will appear in my arguments. Some of the terms are so fundamental that theyContinue reading “Some New Arguments for a First Cause”

From Quantum Entanglement to a Cosmic Substance?

Non-Locality: Action vs. Influence at a Distance It is true that, as Bell’s theorem demonstrated, quantum theory is deeply committed to superluminal influence or coordination. But we have to distinguish between violations of Parameter Independence and violations of Outcome Independence (to use Abner Shimony’s distinction, Shimony 1984). Mere violations of Outcome Independence require only aContinue reading “From Quantum Entanglement to a Cosmic Substance?”

Persistence of Material Parts Through Substantial Change

Here’s a problem that I’ve wrestled with for years: do the material parts (not just at the level of prime matter) of a substance survive through substantial change? For example, suppose a bit of watery fluid is extracted from my eye and placed on a microscope slide. Call the bit of watery stuff W. WhenContinue reading “Persistence of Material Parts Through Substantial Change”

Hylomorphism and Mereology

Some questions and thoughts about hylomorphism and mereology (parts and wholes). Is the substance the sum of its material parts? In some sense, yes, and in some sense, no? The sum of my prime material parts exists as a potentiality, even in the absence of me and my substantial form. That sum does not haveContinue reading “Hylomorphism and Mereology”

God’s Identity with His Essence

Thomas explicitly asserts that God is numerically identical to His essence. God does not have divinity as His nature: He is His own divinity. As we have seen, God is not an abstract object, a post rem property, or a universal. So, what could it mean to say that God is identical to His essenceContinue reading “God’s Identity with His Essence”