Hylomorphism is a research programme in metaphysics and philosophy of nature that has been undergoing a revival in recent years. The core ideas of the programme were developed by Aristotle, including the terms hylos (matter) and morphe (form). The programme has been under almost continuous development ever since, with major contributions by Simplicius, Plotinus, Avicenna, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus. Modern philosophers, including Leibniz, von Trendelenburg, Bolzano, Brentano, and Heidegger, drew inspiration from hylomorphism, and a number of contemporary analytic philosophers have embraced hylomorphism, either in toto or in part.
A programme with such a long history finds expression, unsurprisingly, not in a single theory of the world but in a family of such theories. We find significant variation within tradition especially along two dimensions: one concerning the nature of form, and the other of matter. Along the formal dimension, some (e.g., Boethius, Loux) have defended hylomorphism as a kind of Platonism, in the sense that they take the term ‘form’ to designate primarily a universal entity shared by many particulars. Others (Avicenna, Aquinas) take forms to be individual and particular, giving only a virtual or intentional existence to universals. I will label the first group as ‘extreme realists’ and the second as ‘moderate realists’. Most moderate realists distinguish their hylomorphism from Plato’s own theory in one or both of two ways: (i) by insisting that universals exist in particulars (as so-called immanent universals), and (ii) by insisting that universals depend for their actual existence on having at least one actual instance (so, no uninstantiated universals are possible). I take these two distinctions to be of relatively little importance, and so we will not discuss them further.
Along the material dimension, some take the ultimate sort of matter to be prime matter, a kind of stuff that lacks any scientifically specifiable or measurable nature, a class of bare particulars. Others insist that all bits of ultimate matter belong essentially to some kind of elemental category, like earth or fermions. Still others (following Thomas Aquinas) give a central role to a kind of penultimate form of matter, the signate or designated matter (prime matter assigned certain spatial properties). A second issue concerns the composition of material things: some take matter to be one of two parts (matter + form) that jointly compose material substances, others take a material substance to be in some sense identical to its matter, and still others treat substances as the result of the operation of a form on matter. Finally, hylomorphists disagree about the role that matter plays in a hylomorphic theory. Does matter serve to individuate or distinguish substances of the same kind from each other (as in the case of Max Black’s world of two indiscernible iron spheres)? Or is matter the substrate that underlies all change, no matter how radical? Or does it somehow play both roles?
In a series of posts, I hope to bring some clarity to the proper role of matter in hylomorphic theory. I will undertake an investigation in pure metaphysics and philosophy of nature. I will not here make any claims about the correct interpretation of Aristotle’s corpus or texts written by later hylomorphists. For our present purposes, historical and hermeneutic tasks are relevant only to the extent that they broaden our range of options or offer solutions to exigent problems within the programme.
The Analytic Thomist 