Here’s a problem that I’ve wrestled with for years: do the material parts (not just at the level of prime matter) of a substance survive through substantial change? For example, suppose a bit of watery fluid is extracted from my eye and placed on a microscope slide. Call the bit of watery stuff W. WhenContinue reading “Persistence of Material Parts Through Substantial Change”
Category Archives: Composition
Hylomorphism and Mereology
Some questions and thoughts about hylomorphism and mereology (parts and wholes). Is the substance the sum of its material parts? In some sense, yes, and in some sense, no? The sum of my prime material parts exists as a potentiality, even in the absence of me and my substantial form. That sum does not haveContinue reading “Hylomorphism and Mereology”
Core Commitments of Hylomorphism
Substantiality. The material universe contains substances, fragments (proper parts) of substances, and heaps of substances and fragments. Substances are more fundamental than fragments and heaps in three respects: (i) identity, (ii) existence, and (iii) nature. This rules out what I have called “faint-hearted hylomorphism,” along with any kind of microphysicalism. Hylomorphic composition goes all theContinue reading “Core Commitments of Hylomorphism”
Hylomorphism: An Overview
Hylomorphism is a research programme in metaphysics and philosophy of nature that has been undergoing a revival in recent years. The core ideas of the programme were developed by Aristotle, including the terms hylos (matter) and morphe (form). The programme has been under almost continuous development ever since, with major contributions by Simplicius, Plotinus, Avicenna,Continue reading “Hylomorphism: An Overview”
Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, II
In this post, I will deal with three additional anomalies, possible exceptions to the NSIS principle (No Substance in a Substance): (i) manufacturing organisms from scratch, (ii) borderline cases between organisms and communities, and (iii) transitional forms in evolution. If Hylomorphism is true, it should be impossible to manufacture a living organism from inorganic materials,Continue reading “Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, II”
Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, I
The form provides the organism with its actual existence and nature, and, in turn, the substantial form is individuated by the organism’s prime matter (together with its actual history). The form’s function is to animate and (we might say) rationalize matter, resulting in a sentient and rational organism (in the case of human beings). WhenContinue reading “Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, I”
Two Models of The Soul
Here is a major choice point: is the soul part of the whole substance (the human person or organism) or not? What does it mean for something to be part of some whole? Or, equivalently, what does it mean for something to be a whole composed of certain parts? I propose the following necessary conditionContinue reading “Two Models of The Soul”
Substances, Accidents, and the Tiling Principle
Jonathan Schaffer has proposed the Tiling Principle. Here’s a version of the principle, translated into Aristotelian terms: Strong Tiling Principle TPS1. Necessarily, no substance is a proper part of any other substance. TPS2. Necessarily, the sum of all substances includes every real thing as a part. I will call the conjunction of TPS1 and TPS2Continue reading “Substances, Accidents, and the Tiling Principle”
The Survival of Accidents and Material Parts
I will assume that individual accidents have real definitions, but that these definitions are shared by all the members of an infima species of quality, quantity, or whatever. These definitions include some predication of properties to an external entity (the substance in which an accident must inhere). But the definition won’t include any particular substanceContinue reading “The Survival of Accidents and Material Parts”
The Fundamentality of Composite Things
We can use grounding to define fundamental entities: F1. A thing x is fundamental iff the existence and intrinsic properties of x are not wholly grounded by the existence and intrinsic properties of any other thing or things. Some have suggested that we add the qualification: not wholly grounded by the existence and intrinsic propertiesContinue reading “The Fundamentality of Composite Things”
The Analytic Thomist 