Aristotelian natural philosophy, also known as “hylomorphism,” has the capacity to treat middle-sized things, like human beings, wafers of bread, and goblet-filling bits of wine, as first-class citizens of our ontology, that is, as substances. Substances, on this view, are unified wholes composed of matter and form, whose substantial forms impose certain powers and potentialitiesContinue reading “Staunch Hylomorphism and Transubstantiation”
Category Archives: Hylomorphism
New Natural Law and Natural Teleology
The natural law tradition is rooted in the work of Plato, Aristotle, and others and plays a central and foundation role in the history of Western civilization, in particular, in its conception of ethics, law, and politics. It has played that role simply because it is both profound and correct. Therefore, the task of interpretingContinue reading “New Natural Law and Natural Teleology”
Hylomorphism and Mereology
Some questions and thoughts about hylomorphism and mereology (parts and wholes). Is the substance the sum of its material parts? In some sense, yes, and in some sense, no? The sum of my prime material parts exists as a potentiality, even in the absence of me and my substantial form. That sum does not haveContinue reading “Hylomorphism and Mereology”
Core Commitments of Hylomorphism
Substantiality. The material universe contains substances, fragments (proper parts) of substances, and heaps of substances and fragments. Substances are more fundamental than fragments and heaps in three respects: (i) identity, (ii) existence, and (iii) nature. This rules out what I have called “faint-hearted hylomorphism,” along with any kind of microphysicalism. Hylomorphic composition goes all theContinue reading “Core Commitments of Hylomorphism”
Hylomorphism: An Overview
Hylomorphism is a research programme in metaphysics and philosophy of nature that has been undergoing a revival in recent years. The core ideas of the programme were developed by Aristotle, including the terms hylos (matter) and morphe (form). The programme has been under almost continuous development ever since, with major contributions by Simplicius, Plotinus, Avicenna,Continue reading “Hylomorphism: An Overview”
Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, II
In this post, I will deal with three additional anomalies, possible exceptions to the NSIS principle (No Substance in a Substance): (i) manufacturing organisms from scratch, (ii) borderline cases between organisms and communities, and (iii) transitional forms in evolution. If Hylomorphism is true, it should be impossible to manufacture a living organism from inorganic materials,Continue reading “Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, II”
Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, I
The form provides the organism with its actual existence and nature, and, in turn, the substantial form is individuated by the organism’s prime matter (together with its actual history). The form’s function is to animate and (we might say) rationalize matter, resulting in a sentient and rational organism (in the case of human beings). WhenContinue reading “Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, I”
Advantages of Hylomorphism over Modern Substance Dualism
What are the advantages of hylomorphism over modern substance dualism? At very low levels in the Chain of Being, like the souls of sponges or amoebas, the soul seems to be doing no explanatory work. The soul of an amoeba would seem to be epiphenomenal and causally inert. How would a soulless amoeba function differently?Continue reading “Advantages of Hylomorphism over Modern Substance Dualism”
Mental Causation: Rational Animals
Let’s turn our attention now to the most interesting case: that of the rational animal (the human being). Human beings have the capacity not only to sense and to imagine but to understand. Understanding in this sense involves the capacity to grasp something universal, a concept that can be used to formulate general propositions andContinue reading “Mental Causation: Rational Animals”
Mental Causation: Non-Rational Animals
It’s relatively easy to see how mental causation, both active and passive, would work on the interactionist model. We can simply apply our usual assumptions about per se efficient causal powers. What is more interesting is to work out how such causation could happen on the two emanationist models. To keep things relatively simple, let’sContinue reading “Mental Causation: Non-Rational Animals”
The Analytic Thomist 