Aristotelian natural philosophy, also known as “hylomorphism,” has the capacity to treat middle-sized things, like human beings, wafers of bread, and goblet-filling bits of wine, as first-class citizens of our ontology, that is, as substances. Substances, on this view, are unified wholes composed of matter and form, whose substantial forms impose certain powers and potentialitiesContinue reading “Staunch Hylomorphism and Transubstantiation”
Category Archives: Substances
From Quantum Entanglement to a Cosmic Substance?
Non-Locality: Action vs. Influence at a Distance It is true that, as Bell’s theorem demonstrated, quantum theory is deeply committed to superluminal influence or coordination. But we have to distinguish between violations of Parameter Independence and violations of Outcome Independence (to use Abner Shimony’s distinction, Shimony 1984). Mere violations of Outcome Independence require only aContinue reading “From Quantum Entanglement to a Cosmic Substance?”
Hylomorphism and Mereology
Some questions and thoughts about hylomorphism and mereology (parts and wholes). Is the substance the sum of its material parts? In some sense, yes, and in some sense, no? The sum of my prime material parts exists as a potentiality, even in the absence of me and my substantial form. That sum does not haveContinue reading “Hylomorphism and Mereology”
Core Commitments of Hylomorphism
Substantiality. The material universe contains substances, fragments (proper parts) of substances, and heaps of substances and fragments. Substances are more fundamental than fragments and heaps in three respects: (i) identity, (ii) existence, and (iii) nature. This rules out what I have called “faint-hearted hylomorphism,” along with any kind of microphysicalism. Hylomorphic composition goes all theContinue reading “Core Commitments of Hylomorphism”
Hylomorphism: An Overview
Hylomorphism is a research programme in metaphysics and philosophy of nature that has been undergoing a revival in recent years. The core ideas of the programme were developed by Aristotle, including the terms hylos (matter) and morphe (form). The programme has been under almost continuous development ever since, with major contributions by Simplicius, Plotinus, Avicenna,Continue reading “Hylomorphism: An Overview”
Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, II
In this post, I will deal with three additional anomalies, possible exceptions to the NSIS principle (No Substance in a Substance): (i) manufacturing organisms from scratch, (ii) borderline cases between organisms and communities, and (iii) transitional forms in evolution. If Hylomorphism is true, it should be impossible to manufacture a living organism from inorganic materials,Continue reading “Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, II”
Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, I
The form provides the organism with its actual existence and nature, and, in turn, the substantial form is individuated by the organism’s prime matter (together with its actual history). The form’s function is to animate and (we might say) rationalize matter, resulting in a sentient and rational organism (in the case of human beings). WhenContinue reading “Anomalies and Imperfectly Unified Substances, I”
Objections to Aristotelian Substances
The Argument from Vagueness (David Lewis and Jonathan Schaffer) Unlike atoms and the whole cosmos, the boundaries of Aristotelian substances seem vague and arbitrary. Response: the vagueness is only epistemic. The true parts of a substance are essentially parts of it. The Empirical Argument from Atomism It is hard to believe that individual particles, atoms,Continue reading “Objections to Aristotelian Substances”
Is Substantiality Accidental?
Is substantiality accidental? Can something change from being a substance to being a non-substantial part and back again? Can something change from being fundamental to being non-fundamental or vice versa? It’s clear that things cannot gain or lose the status of being fundamental, since being grounded by something else is anchored in a thing’s essence,Continue reading “Is Substantiality Accidental?”
Substances, Accidents, and the Tiling Principle
Jonathan Schaffer has proposed the Tiling Principle. Here’s a version of the principle, translated into Aristotelian terms: Strong Tiling Principle TPS1. Necessarily, no substance is a proper part of any other substance. TPS2. Necessarily, the sum of all substances includes every real thing as a part. I will call the conjunction of TPS1 and TPS2Continue reading “Substances, Accidents, and the Tiling Principle”
The Analytic Thomist 